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2.1 The other side of social exclusion:




As the chapters in thisbookdemonstrate, social exclusion isakey conceptused
to understand various forms of inequality in contemporary capitalist societies.
I argue in this chapter that while the concept of social exclusion has been
important in illustrating the structural dimensions of unequal social relations
and examining the costs of those relations for excluded groups, it has done
little to address those of uswho bene   tmost from existing social divisions and
inequalities. Nordomostof thewritingson social exclusion examinehow these
inequalities are reproduced by and through the daily practices and life-style
pursuits of privileged groups.
In this chapter Iwill interrogate the concept of privilege as the other side of
social exclusion and will argue that the lack of critical interrogation of the
position of the privileged side of social divisions allows the privileged to
reinforce their dominance. I aim to make privilege more visible and consider
the extent to which those who are privileged can overcome their own self
interest in the maintenance of dominance to enable them to challenge it.
Interrogating social exclusion and inclusion
Social exclusion has become a major concept in social policy research.
Although it is often used to denote those marginalised by non-participation
in the labour market, Lister (2000: 36) says that social exclusion ‘is a multi-
dimensional concept … embracing a variety ofways in which people may be
denied full participation in society’. It is clear, though, that the concept of
social exclusion can be employed in very di   erentways depending on whether
the primary objective is social cohesion or social justice (Lister 2000).
The opposite of social exclusion is seen to be ‘social inclusion ’ which is
de   ned as ‘the attempt to re-integrate or increase the participation of mar-
ginalised groupswithinmainstream goals ’ (Barry 1998: 1). Sheppard (2006: 5)
maintains that social exclusion and inclusion are ‘two sides of the same coin’.
Is social inclusion a solution to the issue ofmarginalisation or does it distract
us from the need for fundamental social change?
Some writers distinguish between di   erent interpretations of social exclu-
sion. One version involves greater integration of excluded people into the
dominant society (Sheppard 2006), while the other version focuses on the
dominant group who are the sources of exclusion (Byrne 2005). However,
what are the consequences of replacing discussions of equality with the con-
cept of social inclusion? Edwards et al. (2001: 425) suggest that the notion of
inclusion positions the excluded as de   cient or deviant who need to conform
to the prevailing norms. I am doubtful that the language of social inclusion
can provide a basis for social change. As Anthias (2000: 839) has noted,
‘subordination and economic exploitation can coexist under inclusion and in
fact they constitute dis-empowering forms of inclusion ’. Jones and Smythe
(1999) suggest that the language of inclusion can actually perpetuate social
exclusion.
Even in the more radical versions of social exclusion, the focus is almost
always on the excluded. Somerville (2000) focuses on the opportunities and
capacity of the excluded to resist the forces of exclusion. Byrne (1999) also
emphasises the potential of the excluded to be organised through coalitions
and social movements that are promoting social solidarity. More recently,
however,Byrne (2005)hasquestionedwhether social exclusion canbe eliminated
by interventions directed solely at the excluded.
Anthias (2000) identi   es the tendency to identify persons as ‘the excluded ’,
and who are said to constitute varying degrees of exclusion from the norma-
tive ideals of the majority. In this regard, there is the danger that those seen as
socially excluded may be portrayed as ‘either passive victims or willing agents
in theirown denigration ’ (Anthias 2000: 838). The focus is thus on the process
of producing ‘a disquali   ed identity ’. She maintains that the focus on the
excluded ‘focuses too much attention at the bottom of the scale and does not
allow for looking at forms of inequalityandhierarchymore generally’ (Anthias
2000: 838). This shifts attention o   the dominant group and reinforces the
tendency of sociology to study ‘downwards ’.
Numerous writers have drawn attention to this focus on studying down-
wards. Bessant and Watts (1999: 309) for example, ask: ‘Why don ’t we
research the wealthy?’ Jamrozik and Nocella (1998) similarly note that aca-
demics study ‘the others ’ rather than studying ‘ourselves’. They observe that
‘There is multitude of studies of “ deviance” of the poor, the disadvantaged,
but relatively few systematically conducted studies of the a   uent and of the
powerful ’ (Jamrozik and Nocella 1998: 217).
Why is this so? Ferber (2003: 319) maintains quite simply that we ‘have
tended to ignore the issueofprivilegebecause it implicates those inpower ’. This
lack of a critical interrogation of privilege and internalised dominance allows
dominant groups to reinforce their dominance. If we focus exclusively upon
oppression and social exclusion, we reinforce the invisibility of privilege. The
powerful and theprivilegedbecome invisiblebecause theyare subsumedunder
the ‘normal and ordinary ’ (Byrne 2005: 57). Understanding the construction
of privilege is necessary for a complete understanding of social exclusion.
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Bailey (1998: 109) describes privilege as ‘systematically conferred advan-
tages individuals enjoy by virtue of their membership in dominant groups
with access to resources and institutional power that are beyond the common
advantages ofmarginalised citizens’. Sidanius and Pratto (1999) identify the
main bene   ts that accrue from privilege: ‘possession of a disproportionately
large share of positive social value or all those material and symbolic things
for which people strive. Examples of positive social value are such things as
political authority and power, good and plentiful food, splendid homes, the
best available health care, wealth and high social status ’ (Sidanius and Pratto
1999: 31–32). Individuals come to possess these bene   ts ‘by virtue of his or
her prescribed membership in a particular socially constructed group such as
race, religion, clan, tribe, ethnic group or social class’ (Sidanius and Pratto
1999: 32). An individual ’sprivilege is thusmoreaproductof theirmembership
of privileged groups than it is of their individual capabilities.
To critically explore the concept of privilege, we need to identify the key
characteristics. There are four main issues that I will discuss here: the invisi-
bility of privilege by those who have it; the power of the privileged group to
determine the social norm; the naturalisation of privilege and the sense of
entitlement that accompanies privilege.
The invisibility of privilege
Most privilege is not recognised as such, by those who have it. In fact, ‘one of
the functions of privilege is to structure the world so that mechanisms of
privileges are invisible – in the sense that they are unexamined – to those who
bene   t from them ’ (Bailey 1998: 112). Johnson (2001) observes how members
of privileged groups either do not understand what others mean when they
refer to them as privileged or they tend to get angry and defensive. Because
privilege does not necessarily bring happiness and ful   lment, this will some-
times be used to deny the existence of privilege. These responses represent
signi   cant obstacles to the struggle for equality.
Members of privileged groups occupy what Rosenblum and Travis (1996)
call an ‘unmarked status ’. By this they mean that people in unmarked cate-
gories do ‘not require any special comment. Thus, the unmarked category
tells us what a society takes for granted ’ (Rosenblum and Travis 1996: 142).
One of the consequences of this is that members of privileged groups are
unlikely to be aware of how others may not have access to the bene   ts that
they receive and thus they are unlikely to be able to acknowledge the experi-
ences of those who are marginalised. Many privileged individuals may thus
oppress people without being aware of it. When people are unable to recog-
nise their privilege because they are so focused on their oppression, they are
unable to see their role in keeping others subordinated.
While members of dominant groups may intentionally oppress others, not
all members of dominant groups behave in oppressive ways. However, the
reproduction of oppression does not demand the intent of individuals. Ferree
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et al. (1999) discusses how, for example, white people gain privileges through
‘the subordination … of people of color, even if he or she is not personally
exploiting or taking advantage of any person of color ’ (Ferree et al. 1999: 11).
The normativity of privilege
Privileged groups havebecome themodel for ‘normativehuman relations ’ and
this explains inpartwhy theydonotwant toknowabout the experiencesof the
excluded (Baker Miller 1995: 61). The privileged group comes to represent the
hegemonic normwhereby ‘white, thinmale young heterosexual Christian and
  nancially secure people come to embodywhat itmeans to be normal ’ (Perry
2001: 192). Perry (2001)observes that through thepositioningof selfandother,
various dualisms are established in which forms of di   erence are devalued
because theyare seen as inferior, weakor subordinate in relation to thenormal
which is presented as superior, strong and dominant. The normativity of pri-
vilege means that this becomes the basis for measuring success and failure.
Thosewho arenotprivileged arepotentially regarded as aberrant anddeviant.
The establishment of this normative standard reproduces the negative valua-
tionofdi   erence. Because theprivileged are regarded as ‘normal ’, theyare less
likely to be studied or researched because the norm does not have to be
‘marked ’. Gender then, for example, becomes a codeword forwomen and race
becomes synonymous with people of colour.
The normativity of privilege provides some insight to the process of
‘othering ’, as the   ipside of the ‘other ’ are the insiders who constitute the
privileged group (Dominelli 2002). Pickering (2001: 73) reminds us ‘that those
who are “ othered ” , are unequally positioned in relation to those who do the
“ othering ”’ (emphasis mine). The latter occupy a privileged space in which
theyde   ne themselves in contrast to theotherswho are designated asdi   erent.
The naturalisation of privilege
The social divisions between the privileged and the oppressed are further
reproduced through their attributed naturalness. Rather than seeing di   erence
as being socially constructed, gender, race, sexuality and class are regarded as
  owing from nature. Beliefs about social hierarchy as being natural provides a
rationale for social dominance and absolves dominant groups from responsibility
to address social inequalities (Gould 2000).
It is the belief in the ‘God-given ’ or biological basis of dominance that
reproduces social inequality. Members of privileged groups either believe that
they have inherited the characteristics that give them advantages or they set
out to consciously cover up the socially constructed basis of their dominance
(Wonders 2000). When we understand the way in which di   erence is socially
constructed, we are more able to develop strategies for challenging inequality.
Part of the process of interrogating dominant identities is to question their
appearance of naturalness. As Tillner reports (1997: 3): ‘It means to lay open
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their contingency, their dependency on power relations and to particularise
them ’. He proposes an important strategy of endeavouring to represent non-
dominant identities as ‘normal ’ and representing dominant identities as ‘par-
ticular ’ as a way of subverting the tendency for dominant groups to always
represent themselves as ‘the universal ’.
The sense of entitlement associated with privilege
Anotheraspectofprivilege is the senseof entitlement thatmembersofprivileged
groups feel about their status. As Rosenblum and Travis (1996: 141) state: ‘The
sense of entitlement that one has a right to be respected, acknowledged, pro-
tected and rewarded – is so much taken for granted by those of us in non-
stigmatised statuses, that they areoften shocked and angeredwhen it is denied
them ’. Lyn (1992), in re   ecting upon her own situation as a white woman,
describes how she had come to believe that she deservedwhateverbene   ts and
status she had attained because she had struggled for them. She did not
recognise how her class and race facilitated that struggle.
Many writers have connected men’s sense ofmale entitlement to violence
against women. As Connell (2000: 3) puts it: ‘From a long history of gender
relations, many men have a sense of entitlement to respect, deference, and
service from women. If women fail to give it, some men will see this as bad
conduct which ought to be punished ’. She also notes that some men will
regardwomen ’s challenge to male entitlement as a threat to their masculinity.
We thus need to understand more clearly how privileged group members ’
sense of entitlement is subjectively experienced and socially constructed.
Hatty (2000: 58) has noted, for example, that ‘men may employ particular
rhetorical devices to reinforce the contours of their version of reality of their
entitlement to use violence’. Adams et al. (1995) identify the ways in which
men use language to reinforce their assumptions aboutmale dominance. Men
construct what Adams et al. (1995) call a ‘discourse of natural entitlement ’
which enables them to believe that they are designed to dominate women.
These discourses legitimate men’s use of violence against women.
Towards an intersectional theory of privilege
While di   erent forms of exclusion are distinct, they are also interrelated and
mutually reinforcing. This approachmeans that peoplewho are excludedmay
also participate in the exclusion of others. It is necessary then for people who
are excluded to not only struggle against their own exclusion but also to
confront theirown privilege and internalised dominance. I recognise, however,
that theonus to change shouldbe greater for thosewhohave access to multiple
levelsofprivilege. In advocating agreater levelof responsibilitybymembersof
dominant groups for the maintenance of privilege, I also acknowledge that an
understanding of privilege necessitates a structural analysis that identi   es the
systemic nature of privilege.
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What an intersectional analysis makes clear is that ‘all groups possess
varying degrees of penalty and privilege in one historically created system’
(Collins 1991: 225). While people   nd it relatively easy to identify their
experience of oppression and exclusion, they often   nd it harder to recognise
how their thoughts and actions uphold the subordination of others. Some
people may struggle against their oppression but at the same time maintain
their access to various dimensions of privilege. When people are able to de   ne
themselves in terms ofone ormore forms ofoppression, theymay not feel the
need to acknowledge themselves as bene   ting from another form or forms of
oppression (Wildman and Davis 2000). Given thatmost people can be seen to
exhibit both some degree of penalty and privilege, it is equally important for
individuals to see themselves as belonging to dominant groups as well as to
excluded groups.
As those groups who are both excluded and privileged start to examine
their privilege, we need to be careful that these groups are not asked to take
more than their share of the responsibility for the reproduction of privilege.
Razack (1998) observes, for example, that white women’s writing is judged
more harshly than white men’s writing. However, following Razack (1998), I
think that groups who are oppressed or excluded on one dimension need to
acknowledge their complicity with other relations of domination and sub-
ordination. We all need to locate ourselves in the social relations of domina-
tion and oppression. If everyone were simply privileged or just subordinated
then the analysis of systems of privilegewould be easier.
The internalisation of dominance and privilege
A concept that has been used to understand some of the ways in which pri-
vileged people sustain their dominant position is ‘internalised domination ’.
Pheterson (1986: 147) de   nes internalised domination as ‘the incorporation
and acceptance by individualswithin a dominant group of prejudices against
others ’. The concept of internalised domination may explain in part ‘why
signi   cant numbers of people from the dominant group seem to hold
oppressive thoughts and exert oppressive behaviour but do not consider
themselves to be oppressive ’ (Mullaly 2002: 145).
Tillner (1997: 2) usefully takes this notion of internalised domination a little
further by de   ning dominance ‘as a form of identity practice that constructs a
di   erencewhich legitimises dominance and grants the agent of dominance the
illusion of a superior identity’. In this process, the identities ofothers are invali-
dated. Thus, because dominance is socially constructed and psychically inter-
nalised, to challenge it, wewill need to exploredi   erentmodels of identity and
construct subjectivities that are not based on domination and subordination.
It is not possible formembers of dominant groups to escape completely the
internalisation of dominance (Johnson 2001). Negative ideas and images are
deeply embedded in the culture and it is unlikely that men, whites and het-
erosexuals will not be a   ected by sexism, racism and homophobia. As noted
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earlier, prejudice is not necessarily always consciously enacted bymembers of
dominant groups.
Bourdieu ’swork is useful in explaining how various forms of inequality are
reproduced and internalised. He formulated the term ‘habitus ’ to explain how
‘a system of stable dispositions ’ lead people to see theworld from a particular
perspective (Bourdieu 1977a). Unlike Marxist and radical humanist views,
however, which outline how people ’s ideas and consciousness are shaped by
dominant ideologies, Bourdieu emphasises how dominant ideologies are
incorporated into the body. He argues that dispositions are ‘beyond the grip
of conscious control and therefore not amenable to transformations or cor-
rections ’ (Bourdieu 2001: 95). Bourdieu regards a person ’s habitus as ‘a direct
productof theperson ’s structural situation; it is the psychological embodiment
of the objective conditions in which one lives’ (Hurst 2001: 198).
The concepts of internalised domination and habitus help us to understand
the seeming paradox that Minow (1990) identi   es in relation to those who
publicly criticise social inequality, while at the same time engaging in prac-
tices that perpetuate these inequalities. While she emphasises the task of
examining and reformulating our assumptions about the social world, she
acknowledges that this requires more than individuals learning to think dif-
ferently, because of the ways in which the individual ’s thinking is shaped by
institutional and cultural forces. Thus, while it is important for individuals to
acknowledge the privileges they have and to speak out against them, it is
impossible to simply relinquish privilege as an act ofwill.
Given the complexity of the issues facing members of privileged groups,
how are they to respondwhen they are challenged about their privilege? How
do egalitarian individuals live their lives inways that are congruentwith their
values and beliefs? It is easy to feel despairwhen one is constantly challenged
by subordinate groups. Are there anyways of resolving these dilemmas?
Privilege and positionality
Those indominant groupswillbemore likely than those in subordinate groups
toargue that existing inequalitiesare legitimateornatural. Sidaniusand Pratto
(1999: 61) formulate the notion of ‘social dominance orientation ’ to explain
‘thevalue thatpeopleplaceonnon-egalitarianismandhierarchically-structured
relations among people and social groups ’. They argue that people develop an
‘orientation towards social dominance ’ by virtue of the power and status of
their primary group. This social dominance orientation is largely a product of
one ’s membershipwithin dominant groups, although they seem to allow that
some members of dominant groups may identify with subordinates.
Most members of privileged groups appear to actively defend privileged
positions. In this context, government interventions aimed at addressing
inequality and mobilisation by socially excluded groups (important as they
both are) seem unlikely to fundamentally change the social relations of dom-
inance and subordination (Crowfoot and Chesler 2003). What likelihood is
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there then that members of privileged groups might form alliances with
excluded groups? What would encourage them to do so?
Just as oppressed groups have a range of strategies available to them to
respond to their oppression, Dominelli (2002) identi   es three strategies that
dominant groups can utilise to respond to concerns or questions about their
privilege: demarcationalist, incorporationist and egalitarian. Demarcational-
ists view the world through a hierarchical lens and endeavour to hold on to
and increase their power and resources to maintain their privileged posi-
tion. Incorporationalists may support incremental changes but they also want
to retain existing social divisions. Egalitarians reject the social order that
grants them privileges because they recognise the injustice associated with
their position.
Harding (1995) believes that it is possible for members of dominant groups
to develop the capacity to see themselves from the perspective of those in
subordinated groups. Because subjectivity is generated through social pro-
cesses, she argues that dominant subjectivities can also be changed by these
processes. Dominant groups do not necessarily form a homogeneous network
of shared interests, making it possible for members of dominant groups to
‘resist the usual assumptions and orientations of those groups ’ (Sawhney
1995: 284). This is consistentwithmy experience of constructing aprofeminist
men’s standpoint in researching the experiences ofmen (Pease 2000).
Bailey’s (2000) argument that members of dominant groups can develop
what she calls ‘traitorous identities ’, adds support to this position. She di   er-
entiates between those who are unaware of their privilege and those who are
critically cognisant of their privilege. Traitors are thus those who refuse to
reproduce their privilege and who challenge the worldviews that dominant
groups are expected to adhere to. These dominant group members are able to
identify with the experiences of oppressed groups. It is from this basis that
white people will challenge racism and that men will challenge patriarchy. So
while it is di   cult for members of privileged groups to critically appraise their
own position, it is not impossible.
The process of developing a traitorous identity involves learning to see the
world through the experiences of the oppressed (Bailey 2000). This may not
be fully possible but members of dominant groups can make a choice about
accepting or rejecting their part in the establishment. Members of privileged
groups have a responsibility to deconstruct their own discourse. As Johnson
(2001: 166) says, it is more important for ‘members of privileged groups to
work with others on issues of privilege rather than trying to help members of
subordinate groups ’.
Privilege as structured action: doing dominance
It is through the processes of accomplishing gender, race and class, etcetera,
that social dominance is reproduced. Rather than seeing concepts like race,
gender and class as rei   ed categories, we should be more interested in the
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processesofgendering, racialisingand classing. In thisproject, Idrawupon the
work of Fenstermaker and West (2002a) who set out to analyse how race,
gender and class constitute ‘ongoing methodical and situated accomplish-
ments ’ (2002a: 75). They analyse how people conduct themselves in speci   c
situations to understand ‘how the most fundamental divisions of our society
are legitimated andmaintained ’ (Fenstermaker and West 2002a: 78).
Messerschmidt (1997: 4) similarly, in discussing crime as ‘structured action’,
emphasises how ‘the social construction of gender, race and class involves a
situated, social and interactional accomplishment ’. Gender, race and class are
thus a series of activities that we do in speci  c situations that are in   uenced
by structural constraints. Because they involve accomplishments enacted by
human agents, it is possible to resist the reproduction of social structures.
Talking speci   cally about men, for example, Messerschmidt (1993) argues
that masculinity is something that has to be accomplished in speci   c social
contexts. It is ‘whatmen do under speci  c constraints and varying degrees of
power ’ (Messerschmidt 1993: 81).
When we act in theworld, we are not just operating within structural con-
straints. Rather, we are also determining the nature of those structures
through our actions and interactions. The structures which oppress us then
are not only contextual. They are also constituted through our actions. This
means thatwe can challenge those arrangements by engaging in ‘inappropri-
ate ’ racial or gender behaviour.
Various commentators have argued that this approach neglects the struc-
tural dimensions of inequality. Maldonado (2002: 85) for example, says that
there is insu   cient acknowledgement of ‘the constraints imposed by the
macro-level forces in the social environment ’. O’Brien and Howard (1998:
xiv) also argue that this approach ‘obscures institutional and structural power
relations ’. Weber (2002: 89) says that Fenstermaker and West obscure ‘the
mechanisms of power in the production andmaintenance of racism, class and
sexism’ because therein ‘exclusive attention to face to face interaction, macro
social structural processes such as institutional arrangements are rendered
invisible’. In Weber’s view, the structural dimensions of social inequalities
cannot be transformed by ‘the attitudes and actions of a few actors in everyday
interactions ’ (2002: 90).
Certainly, we must acknowledge the importance of locating class, gender
and race relations in the context of institutional structures. We must also
accept that ‘gender, and race, class and compulsory heterosexuality extend
deep into the unconscious and outward into social structure and material
interests ’ (Thorne 2002: 85). However, how useful is it to establish a dualityof
micro andmacro forces? Whymust structure and action be represented as an
either/or opposition? Because I am interested in opposition, resistance and
change, social action that challenges the processes of ‘di   erentiating persons
according to sex categories, race categories and/or class categories … under-
mines the legitimacy of existing institutional arrangements ’ (Fenstermaker
and West 2002b: 99).
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O’Brien (1998: 25) captures the complexity well when she says that ‘we are
socially constituted subjects who navigate webs ofopportunities and obstacles
not necessarily of our own choosing ’. Furthermore, I agree wholeheartedly
with Collins et al. (2002: 81) who argue that the concept of interlocking
oppressions must involve a recognition of both ‘macro-level connections ’ at
the level of social structures and ‘micro-level processes’ which describes how
individuals experience their positions within the hierarchies of domination
and oppression. In challenging the dichotomisation of micro and macro
forces, we must view the relationship between social structure and social
action as ‘dynamic and reciprocal ’ (Messerschmidt 1997: 14). While social
structure is reproduced by the widespread and continual actions of indivi-
duals, it also ‘produces subjects’. Individuals do not simply produce gender,
race and class in a vacuum. Rather, they are reproduced and constrained by
institutional settings such as families, workplaces and the state.
We must move beyond this con   ict between ‘social constructionist ’ and
‘structuralist ’ approaches. We must interrogate privilege at interactional, cul-
tural and structural levels at the same time that we explore the intersections
of privilege with social exclusion.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that to gain a broader understanding of the
processes that produce social exclusion, we need to focus on the individuals
and groups who bene   t from those processes and activities. We must all
recognise how we are enmeshed in the social relations of dominance and
subordination that we criticise and that we too are likely to have internalised
dominance in varying degrees (Brewer 1997).
Although I teach courses about and write articles and books on dominant
forms ofmasculinity and privilege, I still bene   t from gender, race, class and
sexual privilege. In what ways does the academic discourse exclude the voices
ofmarginalised people? Is it enough for us to be simply critical of our posi-
tioning, while doing nothing to change the material conditions that produce
it? Obviously not, but if we own our positionality, we at least challenge the
view that the white middle-class male perspective represents some form of
transcendent truth. To challenge this ethos, more white middle-class men will
need to read and re   ect upon the writings by those who are marginalised and
excluded. We need to feel distressed by these experiences and come to dis-
approve of our unearned advantages which are conferred upon us simply
because of our membership of privileged groups. Such distress may be the
starting point for more of us to challenge the systems that bene   t us unfairly.
Notes
1 An earlier, shorter version of the discussion of the characteristics of privilege was
published as part of the following article: Pease, B. (2006) ‘Encouraging critical
re  ectionsonprivilege in Social Work’, Practice Re   exions, Vol. 1, No. 1,pp. 15–25.
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